Straits Crisis: On the Precipice of Devastation

From a strategic analysis perspective, assessing Iranian capabilities and the potential to close the Strait of Hormuz, or the duration of such a closure, is informed by a combination of strategic inputs and parallel historical analysis. Shipping disruption along the Iranian coastline, as a matter of military doctrine, is certainly not new. While the context differs from the interstate conflict with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, the period commonly known as the “Tanker War” reflected a doctrine of strategic denial directed at Iran’s adversaries. This campaign sustained attacks on oil tankers from roughly 1984 to 1988, while broader anti-shipping activity continued from 1981 to 1988. History in this case is instructive, particularly as the conflict accelerated after Iraq attacked Kharg Island, prompting Iran to retaliate by targeting Gulf shipping. Hundreds of vessels were threatened or damaged, insurance rates surged, and global oil prices reacted sharply. Even after the United States launched Operation Earnest Will in 1987 to escort tankers, attacks continued to increase until the ceasefire in 1988. This reflects that even a degraded, post-revolutionary Iran, engaged in a large-scale interstate ground war with a formidable adversary, was able to conduct sustained maritime security denial in the Gulf for approximately seven years. Despite the presence of a U.S. escort mission, the intensity of activity escalated rather than diminished. Today’s Iran could plausibly sustain similar, or even more prolonged, disruption. Instead of facing Saddam Hussein’s combined-arms offensive backed by U.S. support, Iran is now confronted by a combined U.S. and Israeli air and naval campaign. For this contemporary conflict, Iran has spent decades preparing for this contingency, effectively militarising aspects of the state for protracted conflict, refining command structures, dispersing production capabilities, and developing asymmetric maritime warfare strategies. These preparations suggest that Iran retains the capacity to sustain maritime denial operations for an extended period, even under significant military pressure, complicating efforts to ensure uninterrupted shipping through the Strait.

Further to this, Iran's formidability is certainly not that of a paper tiger and should not be underestimated. This reality inevitably translates into a more credible and potentially prolonged ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, extending beyond several weeks and potentially into months, particularly if Western military responses are slow, fragmented, or politically constrained. Even with a coordinated response, there is no assurance of rapid success in maritime force-projection operations, especially given current limitations in Western naval capacity in the Gulf. European naval capabilities, in particular, remain constrained: France stands as the only European power with relatively robust expeditionary maritime capacity, while the United Kingdom’s naval forces have faced readiness and availability challenges, and smaller EU states are often able to deploy only a limited number of frigates, with very few possessing destroyers, replenishment vessels, carrier aviation, submarines or persistent surveillance assets. This structural limitation complicates any sustained escort or mine countermeasures operation across a geographically confined yet operationally complex maritime chokepoint.

Adding to this, the geopolitical environment has shifted significantly since the unipolar moment of the 1990s and early 2000s, when U.S. hegemonic dominance allowed for rapid coalition formation and overwhelming strategic superiority. The war in Ukraine has drawn substantial military, economic, and political capital away from Western states, particularly in Europe, which has been heavily engaged in supporting Kiev while managing energy disruptions, inflationary pressures, and defence industrial strain. This prolonged commitment, along with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, has also influenced the domestic political appetite for additional large-scale military engagement, especially operations that could escalate into broader regional conflict. Public fatigue amid the economic consequences of the Ukraine war, combined with the lingering socioeconomic effects of COVID-19 lockdowns, further reduces the likelihood of sustained political support for high-risk maritime denial operations against Iran, which would risk further escalation and Western power involvement in the ongoing Iran War.

Moreover, Iran does not operate in isolation and, in many respects, functions as a regional power with diplomatic, economic, and strategic depth. Its participation in frameworks such as BRICS, alongside the development of bilateral defence and security cooperation with Russia, provides a degree of diplomatic cover, intelligence exchange, and potential material support, even if indirect. Beyond state-to-state relationships, Iran’s network of aligned non-state and paramilitary actors represents a significant force multiplier. These include Hezbollah in Lebanon, elements within Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces, the Houthis in Yemen, residual pro-regime armed elements from Syria, and militant groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza. Collectively, these forces represent an approximate combined manpower pool in the half-million range, on a conservative estimate, with some assessments suggesting even higher figures. The significance of this aggregate manpower lies less in conventional battlefield mass and more in the distributed, multi-theatre pressure these groups can exert simultaneously, creating overlapping fronts that complicate maritime security operations and dilute Western military focus, all while maintaining long-range disruptive capabilities across the entire region.

Further reinforcing this dynamic, Iran itself possesses one of the largest military structures in the Middle East. Active personnel are commonly estimated at roughly 350,000 in the regular army (Artesh), approximately 190,000 in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and tens of thousands of Basij paramilitary personnel in organised active formations, with wartime mobilisation reserves potentially reaching around one million. Together, this combination of indigenous military strength, asymmetric maritime doctrine, and regionally distributed allied forces significantly enhances Iran’s ability to sustain disruption operations and complicates any rapid effort to restore uninterrupted shipping through the Strait.

Additionally, Iranian logistical lines have been extensively militarised and prepared for sustained conflict, supported by a developed and hardened infrastructure of manufacturing facilities and munitions storage sites located in deep underground bunkers. Iran has deliberately taken advantage of its naturally defensible mountainous terrain to disperse and fortify key military-industrial assets. This configuration allows Iran to continue projecting force and disrupting shipping even under sustained bombardment by advanced U.S. and Israeli munitions such as precision-guided bombs and cruise missiles. Iranian planners also understand the deterrent value of escalation management. When Israel or the United States crosses perceived red lines by targeting critical energy infrastructure, such as major gas fields or industrial facilities, Iran responds by targeting oil and gas infrastructure belonging to U.S. allies across the Gulf and Levant. This reciprocal threat creates an additional protective layer for Iran’s force-projection capabilities, as adversaries must weigh the regional economic consequences of escalation.

Furthermore, Iran’s leadership calculates that it faces fewer domestic political pressures related to retaliatory strikes on infrastructure compared with Western democracies. Historical precedents, including infrastructure-targeting campaigns in other conflicts, such as the 2011 conflict in Libya, demonstrate how attacks on water systems, ports, business districts, and airports can accelerate state collapse. Iran’s doctrine, therefore, includes the capacity to threaten such targets as a form of escalation control, potentially prolonging its ability to sustain military operations and possesses a more bolstered resilience to critical civic infrastructure strikes, having adapted to the adverse conditions of years of sanctions, making it less susceptible to normal civic crisis shocks than its regional neighbours, with a consolidated religious militarist form of governance much less vulnerable to normal degradation of state services such as power and water outages.

Equally important is Iran’s capacity to launch and maintain a steady flow of munitions from hardened sites, combined with mobile launch platforms for drones and missiles. This mobility complicates targeting efforts and allows Iran to maintain consistent operational pressure. A key element of this doctrine is the strategic depletion of U.S. and Israeli denial capabilities, including radar networks, counter-UAS systems, and missile interceptor batteries across the wider region. Iranian forces have closely studied interception patterns and recognise vulnerabilities that emerge when defensive systems are stretched across multiple theatres. As interception stocks and readiness decline, Iran’s ability to sustain maritime denial operations increases, extending beyond ship targeting to include port infrastructure and logistics hubs.

Supply chains have also been consolidated and prepared for wartime operations. Drone production capacity is not limited to domestic facilities in Iran; it has been complemented by external manufacturing partnerships, including production infrastructure in Tajikistan, for example, where facilities established in Dushanbe in 2022 have expanded. This distributed production network enables continued supply flows via land routes and reduces vulnerability to air strikes. Collectively, hardened infrastructure, escalation deterrence, mobile launch capability, and diversified supply chains enhance Iran’s resilience and strengthen its capacity to sustain prolonged disruption operations; furthermore, it is likely not isolated to Dushanbe alone.

Further to this, the effectiveness of ongoing combat operations and the long-term strategic gains is being brought into question. If the intention of regime change has failed and has hardened the existing leadership into a much more formidable power structure, the question becomes how any credible offramp can be constructed if leadership remains intact and more resilient and hardline than before, missile capacities are still present, and there is no guarantee of the full destruction of the Iranian nuclear program. Additionally, dilemmas of operational predominance are emerging. It remains unclear whether operations and their respective objectives are fully aligned between Israel and the United States, whether there is parity of planning, a coherent hierarchical mission set, or unified approaches to managing escalation. This lack of clarity raises concerns about overall campaign cohesion. Further to this, the target acquisition and the battle-damage effectiveness of a heavy bombing campaign are increasingly being scrutinised. This is vital in strategic, legal, and domestic political terms, particularly for the United States, with electoral pressures mounting ahead of the midterms.

Recent staff cuts at the Pentagon have also raised concerns about the effectiveness of signals intelligence, particularly following incidents such as the strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls' primary school in Minab, Iran, that have prompted scrutiny of target-validation processes. Questions arise as to whether reduced staffing may have affected combat accuracy in acquiring and validating targets, potentially prolonging the conflict, increasing munitions expenditure, and lowering the threshold for target clearance, thereby drastically increasing civilian casualties. These factors contribute to growing strategic and operational execution concerns about the sustainability of force projection and the drain of capabilities from other theatres, such as Europe or Asia. Expending large quantities of difficult-to-produce munitions within a short timeframe, amid a volatile geopolitical environment and emerging threats, raises questions about the campaign's overall strategic effectiveness. Furthermore, domestic appetite for ongoing operations with no end in sight is limited among significant portions of U.S. voters, and the longer and more intense the conflict becomes without clear progress, the greater dissatisfaction will grow. This dynamic ultimately affects the broader balance, as slowed operational effectiveness, combined with domestic political pressure, reduced intelligence capacity, and high rates of munitions expenditure, will inevitably enhance Iran’s ability to sustain combat operations, particularly if battle damage to Iranian capabilities remains limited.

The concluding assessment is that Iran’s current capabilities in these contexts are exceptionally formidable, that it could sustain disruption of the Strait through denial operations for a longer timeframe than is being estimated, and that even with a maritime escort mission and potential ground-force intervention, there is no guarantee the Strait would be reopened unless there is a peace agreement. Based on baseline strategic factors and historical precedent, it is reasonable to assess that Iran could maintain pressure for as long as it deems necessary, exceeding internal Western estimates suggesting a closure lasting no more than two months. As Iran perceives itself to be facing an existential crisis of state destruction, it is likely to continue to employ hardened capabilities across multiple domains, including maritime, missile, and proxy-based operations and sustain these capabilities for as long as they require. These layered capabilities, combined with resilient logistics and dispersed infrastructure, could enable sustained combat operations over a significantly longer timeframe than assessments anticipate. Consequently, any assumption of a short-lived disruption risks underestimating both Iran’s operational depth and its willingness to absorb costs and inflict higher costs in pursuit of strategic objectives.

Given the assessment that Iran possesses the capability and doctrinal intent to sustain prolonged maritime denial operations in the Strait of Hormuz, potentially extending beyond optimistic Western timelines, the European Union should structure its response around endurance, resilience, and strategic continuity rather than assumptions of rapid restoration of navigation. The central implication of the preceding analysis is that disruption may not take the form of a permanent blockade but rather a sustained campaign of intermittent harassment, mining threats, missile signalling, and insurance destabilisation designed to undermine navigational confidence. Such a strategy could persist for much longer than a few weeks or months, particularly if Western responses remain politically constrained, operationally fragmented, or limited by naval capacity. Therefore, the EU should prepare for a prolonged period of instability in global energy markets and maritime transit, requiring a comprehensive, multi-domain response spanning energy security, maritime protection, logistics resilience, diplomacy, financial stabilisation, and defence readiness.

The EU's priority should be the immediate activation of coordinated energy security mechanisms. The prolonged disruption of Hormuz traffic is already significantly affecting global oil and LNG flows, creating price shocks and supply dislocation that is reverberating through European economies, not to mention the disruption of energy supply and port infrastructure in tandem with attacks on tankers. The EU should therefore implement synchronised releases of strategic petroleum reserves, using the collective stockpiles maintained by member states as a stabilisation tool. These reserves provide a critical buffer that can mitigate short-term volatility while preserving capacity for sustained disruption. A phased release strategy should be adopted to avoid exhausting reserves prematurely, accompanied by internal solidarity mechanisms that allow the redistribution of stocks to the most exposed member states. In parallel, supply diversification should be accelerated, increasing imports from alternative producers and encouraging refiners to adjust to different crude blends. Demand-side measures, including voluntary consumption reductions and targeted support for critical industries, should complement supply-side actions to dampen inflationary pressures and reduce the risk of cascading economic shocks.

The EU must also address risks to LNG supply, given that significant volumes transit through the Strait. Although expanded European LNG infrastructure provides some resilience, prolonged disruption would require coordinated procurement to avoid internal competition. Joint purchasing mechanisms should therefore be activated to coordinate gas procurement and maintain equitable distribution across member states. Diplomatic outreach to Gulf producers should focus on maximising alternative export routes that bypass the Strait, even if these cannot fully replace maritime flows. At the same time, coordinated fiscal measures may be required to cushion households and energy-intensive sectors from sustained price increases. Maintaining economic stability within the Union will be essential to preserving political cohesion during a prolonged crisis.

The second pillar of the EU response should focus on defensive maritime security. Analysis of Iranian capabilities suggests that disruption is taking the form of layered anti-access and area-denial tactics, including mines, drones, coastal missiles, and fast-attack craft. The EU should therefore immediately enhance maritime domain awareness, intelligence fusion, and defensive escort planning rather than attempting to reopen the Strait unilaterally. Additional naval deployments by member states with expeditionary capabilities should prioritise protecting commercial shipping, monitoring threats, and supporting mine countermeasures operations. Mine warfare represents a particularly significant challenge, as even limited deployment can delay shipping for extended periods due to clearance requirements. Strengthening mine countermeasure capabilities and improving surveillance of shipping lanes should therefore be central to EU maritime planning. Coordination with multinational naval forces will be essential, as restoring navigational confidence will likely require collective capability. Contingency planning for rerouting shipping along longer alternative routes should also be integrated into EU logistics planning despite increased transit times. Intersplicing contemporary conflict interoperability would also be essential in this regard, ensuring that each escorted maritime freight carrier has appropriate C-UAS and missile-interceptor capability coverage, along with daisy-chained mobile EW radar systems placed on European freight carriers.

Commercial shipping continuity should be treated as a strategic objective because Iran’s most effective tool is not necessarily physical interdiction, but rather the creation of a risk perception sufficient to deter commercial operators. Insurance withdrawal, crew safety concerns, and fragmented regulatory guidance could halt shipping even in the absence of sustained attacks. The EU should therefore establish coordinated financial and regulatory measures to maintain commercial flows. These could include common risk guidance, temporary insurance guarantees, and prioritisation of critical cargoes such as energy supplies and industrial inputs. Maintaining navigational confidence will be essential to preventing an effective closure driven by market behaviour.

Diplomatic engagement should remain central to the EU response. The Union should leverage its diplomatic channels with regional partners and international organisations to promote de-escalation and reinforce the principle of freedom of navigation. Engagement with Gulf states should focus on infrastructure protection, export continuity, and coordinated messaging. Diplomatic efforts should also aim to build an international consensus that sustained disruption of the Strait violates widely accepted norms governing transit passage through international straits. At the same time, diplomacy should aim to prevent escalation that could transform intermittent disruption into prolonged regional conflict. The EU’s comparative advantage lies in combining legal legitimacy, economic leverage, and crisis management rather than prioritising coercive military action. De-escalation off-ramps must be pursued urgently, alongside efforts to secure a peaceful settlement to the wider conflict. Failing to use the European Union’s diplomatic influence to broker such an outcome risks severe and lasting consequences. If the Iran conflict continues, the effects for the EU could be economically, socially, politically, and strategically devastating. In the short term, the Union faces price shocks; in the medium term, sustained inflationary pressure; and in the long term, the risk of a major economic degradation. This would stem in part from the extensive destruction to the Gulf region’s maritime transit routes and energy infrastructure, which are central to global supply chains and energy output. Beyond these direct impacts, the conflict would inevitably trigger broader geopolitical ripple effects in other regions, compounding instability as the situation develops.

Logistics resilience within European supply chains should also be strengthened. A prolonged disruption would affect not only crude oil but also petrochemical feedstocks and refined products critical to European industry. The EU should coordinate with ports, shipping operators, and storage facilities to manage rerouted cargo flows and extended delivery cycles. Strategic stockpiles of refined fuels and industrial chemicals may need to be released alongside crude reserves to prevent cascading shortages. Increased traffic on alternative routes would require adjustments in tanker availability, port scheduling, and storage capacity across major European terminals. These logistical measures are essential to sustaining industrial production during extended disruption.

Financial stabilisation should complement physical supply management. Prolonged disruption would likely increase inflationary pressure and create volatility in the energy and transport sectors. Coordinated communication strategies should reassure markets and reduce speculation. Coordination between finance ministries and central banks may provide liquidity support for affected industries. Temporary regulatory flexibility may also allow rapid contracting for alternative supply sources and strategic storage adjustments. These measures would help prevent secondary economic shocks and preserve internal EU cohesion.

Cyber and infrastructure resilience should also be integrated into the response. Maritime disruption scenarios are often accompanied by cyber activity targeting ports, energy trading platforms, and logistics networks. The EU should enhance monitoring and protection of critical infrastructure to prevent additional disruptions. Strengthening cyber coordination mechanisms and supporting member states with shared capabilities to protect maritime and energy infrastructure would reduce vulnerability to hybrid threats.

Finally, the EU should use the crisis to address structural gaps in defence readiness that the preceding assessment of Iranian capabilities highlighted. A prolonged disruption would expose shortages in mine countermeasure vessels, surveillance systems, maritime patrol capabilities, and defensive munitions. Coordinated defence-industrial planning should prioritise maintenance, spare parts availability, and accelerated procurement of maritime security capabilities. This medium-term investment would improve resilience to future crises, reduce dependence on external actors, and release an additional source of manufacturing pressure, initially arising from the Ukraine War.

Overall, if Iran can sustain layered maritime denial operations for a lengthy period, the EU must respond with a strategy built on endurance rather than rapid resolution. The Union should assume prolonged disruption, activate energy reserves, diversify supply, reinforce maritime defensive capabilities, support commercial shipping, enhance logistics resilience, stabilise financial markets, and pursue sustained diplomatic engagement. Such a comprehensive response aligns with the assessment that Iran’s objective is to impose a persistent, lengthy transit disruption. By prioritising resilience and coordination, the EU can mitigate economic disruption and preserve freedom of navigation even during an extended crisis in the Strait of Hormuz.